Section 372 of the CrPC originally barred appeals from any judgment or order of a criminal court except as expressly permitted by law. The CrPC (Amendment) Act, 2008 (effective 31 December 2009), introduced a proviso to Section 372, granting victims a statutory right to appeal in three situations:

• against an order of acquittal,
• against conviction for a lesser offence, or
• against inadequate compensation[3].

This amendment marked a shift towards victim-centric jurisprudence, reflecting the recommendations of the Malimath Committee and the 154th Law Commission Report, both of which relied on the 1985 UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power. The reforms recognized that victims, as the primary sufferers of crime, must be accorded rights and remedies within the justice system[4].

Analysis of the Judgment

The central question in M/s Celestium Financial v. A. Gnanasekaran was whether a complainant in a cheque dishonour case under Section 138 of the NI Act could maintain an appeal against acquittal under the proviso to Section 372 CrPC by being treated as a “victim” as defined in Section 2(wa) of the CrPC[5].

The Supreme Court held that a complainant who suffers financial loss in a cheque dishonour case qualifies as a “victim” under Section 2(wa). Accordingly, such complainants are entitled to appeal under the proviso to Section 372 without the requirement of obtaining special leave under Section 378(4). The Court further clarified that Parliament deliberately conferred a superior right on victims under Section 372’s proviso, unlike the conditional right of complainants under Section 378(4). Victims have an absolute statutory right to appeal, at par with the accused’s unqualified right to appeal a conviction under Section 374 CrPC.

This ruling resolved the long-standing conflict regarding the interplay between Section 372 and Section 378(4) and affirmed that the right to appeal under the proviso is an independent statutory right that does not depend on prior permission of the High Court. This interpretation aligns with the objective of the 2009 amendment, to empower victims with a direct appellate remedy[6].

Forum of Appeal

The proviso to Section 372 not only grants the right to appeal but also determines the forum. Appeals must be filed in the court where an appeal would ordinarily lie against a conviction from the trial court. Thus, as per Section 374 CrPC:

1. if the order is passed by a Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate, the appeal lies to the Sessions Court;
2. if by a Sessions Judge or Assistant Sessions Judge, to the High Court; and
3. if by the High Court in its original jurisdiction, to the Supreme Court.

The Celestium judgment reinforced this framework by clarifying that appeals under Section 372 are not subject to the special leave requirement under Section 378(4), but instead follow the same forum rules as conviction appeals.

This, however, raises anomalies. Some appeals from acquittals by Magistrates now lie before Sessions Courts without the leave requirement, while similar appeals under Section 378(4) still require leave. Further, cases already pending before High Courts under leave-to-appeal petitions remain unresolved by this ruling. These issues highlight the need to harmonize Sections 372, 374, and 378(4) to avoid procedural inconsistencies.

Towards a Victim-Centric Appellate Framework

In Mallikarjun Kodagali (Dead) represented through LR’s v. State of Karnataka and Ors., the Court had held that although the victim may have a right to appeal, this right cannot exceed the rights available to the State or to a complainant. By contrast, Celestium Financial establishes a watershed in victim jurisprudence[7]. It ensures that complainants in cheque dishonour cases are not burdened with the procedural rigours of Section 378(4) but instead have direct recourse under Section 372’s proviso. By clarifying the overlap between Sections 372 and 378(4), the Supreme Court has strengthened the victim’s role in appellate proceedings.