News

Reproduction of an Arbitral Award Does Not, by Itself, Render a Section 34 Judgment Non-Speaking: Delhi High Court

The Hon’ble Delhi High Court, in Mumbai International Airport Limited v. Airports Authority of India (FAO(OS) (COMM) 202/2024; 2026 SCC OnLine Del 8010), decided on October 16, 2026, held that the mere reproduction of substantial portions of an arbitral award in a judgment dismissing a challenge under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, does not, by itself, establish non-application of mind. The Court reiterated that the scope of interference under Section 37 is narrower than that under Section 34 and that an appellate court cannot reassess the merits of an arbitral award.

The dispute arose pursuant to an Operation, Management and Development Agreement (“OMDA”) executed between Mumbai International Airport Limited (“MIAL”) and the Airports Authority of India (“AAI”) on April 4, 2006, following the privatisation of the Mumbai airport. AAI had previously executed a lease agreement with Sahara (Batra) Hospitality Private Limited in respect of land situated within the airport premises. Although the Sahara Lease was included among the “Existing Leases” under the OMDA and the land covered by it was excluded from the premises demised to MIAL, Article 5.2(b)(i) contemplated the transfer or novation of existing contracts and agreements between AAI and third parties relating to the airport.

MIAL contended that the said provision required AAI to transfer or assign its lessor’s interest under the Sahara Lease. It relied upon AAI’s letter dated June 9, 2006, the transfer of lease amounts by AAI to MIAL for approximately ten years, and communications issued by the Ministry of Civil Aviation (“MoCA”). However, the Sahara Lease was never novated, and AAI discontinued the payments with effect from April 1, 2019. MIAL consequently invoked arbitration seeking, inter alia, a declaration and direction for the transfer or assignment of the lease and monetary reliefs. The Arbitral Tribunal rejected MIAL’s claims by a unanimous award dated March 23, 2023. MIAL’s subsequent petition under Section 34 challenging the award was also dismissed by the learned Single Judge by judgement dated April 10, 2024, leading to the present appeal under Section 37.

MIAL argued that the learned single judge had failed to independently examine the grounds raised in its Section 34 petition and had substantially reproduced the arbitral award. On the merits, it submitted that Article 5.2(b)(i) expressly contemplated the transfer or novation of all existing contracts and agreements and did not exclude existing leases. It further contended that the exclusion of the land covered by the Sahara Lease from the Demised Premises did not preclude the separate transfer of AAI’s lessor’s interest. AAI, on the other hand, maintained that the relevant provisions of the OMDA and the MIAL Lease Deed excluded existing leases from the demised premises until their expiry or early termination. It submitted that the payments made to MIAL were part of an interim arrangement and did not establish any transfer or novation of the Sahara Lease. It also disputed the legal effect of the MoCA communications relied upon by MIAL.

The Hon’ble Delhi High Court observed that the jurisdiction under Section 34 does not permit courts to sit in appeal over arbitral awards or substitute their own interpretation of contractual provisions for that of the Arbitral Tribunal. The jurisdiction under Section 37 is narrower still, as the appellate court can only examine whether the court exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 has acted within the statutory limits. In this regard, the Court relied upon MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC 163, and UHL Power Co. Limited v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2022) 4 SCC 116.

On the question of whether the learned Single Judge’s reproduction of portions of the award rendered the judgement non-speaking, the Court held that the decisive consideration was whether the judgement, read as a whole, demonstrated meaningful adjudication of the objections raised. A court is not required to formulate an entirely independent set of reasons in its own words and may adopt the reasoning of the Arbitral Tribunal where it finds the same legally sustainable. However, mechanical reproduction of an award without examining material objections would not satisfy this requirement. Applying this principle, the Court found that the learned Single Judge had considered the relevant contractual provisions and the grounds raised by MIAL and rejected the objection that the judgement was nonspeaking, while observing that the learned Single Judge could have dealt more expressly with AAI’s letter dated June 9, 2006, and the subsequent rent payments.

With respect to the interpretation of Article 5.2(b)(i), the Court observed that the exclusion of land covered by Existing Leases from the Demised Premises did not, by itself, establish that the lessor’s interest under such leases was also excluded from the provision. Nevertheless, the Tribunal’s interpretation, when read in the context of the contractual framework, was not shown to be so unreasonable as to warrant interference under Section 34. The Court further held that AAI’s letter dated June 9, 2006, and the subsequent payments made to MIAL were relevant to the interpretation of the contractual arrangement but did not independently establish that the lessor’s interest had been transferred or that AAI was contractually bound to effect such a transfer. Similarly, the Tribunal’s conclusion that the MoCA communications did not constitute policy directions under Section 40 of the Airports Authority of India Act, 1994, was not shown to be legally untenable or perverse, and the minutes of the Inter-Ministerial Group meeting dated October 18, 2004, which predated the OMDA, did not, by themselves, establish a binding contractual obligation. The Court clarified that this conclusion was confined to the arbitral challenge and did not determine any independent public-law issue concerning a direction validly issued under Section 40.

Accordingly, the Hon’ble Delhi High Court found no ground for interference with the decision of the learned Single Judge and dismissed MIAL’s appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.