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UPI PIN Authentication Not Enough To Fix Liability On Customer

The District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Nalgonda, has held that authentication of a UPI transaction through a PIN, registered mobile number and SIM-binding mechanism does not, by itself, conclusively establish that the account holder personally authorised the transaction or was negligent in safeguarding the credentials. In Bolla Kalpana v. State Bank of India & Ors. (Consumer Complaint No. 20 of 2025), decided on November 10, 2026, the Commission relied on the Reserve Bank of India’s circular dated July 6, 2017, on limiting customer liability in unauthorised electronic banking transactions, which places the burden of proving customer liability on the bank.

The complainant, a housewife, alleged that ₹55,000 was debited from her SBI savings account through a UPI transaction on November 3, 2022, without her knowledge or authorisation. She said she had not shared her credentials with anyone. She reported the incident on the National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal on November 6, 2022, and gave the SBI branch a written complaint on November 7, 2022, which the bank acknowledged the same day. The amount was not restored. An FIR was registered on December 31, 2024, and she filed the consumer complaint on March 7, 2025.

SBI’s branch and regional office contended that the transaction had been authenticated through the registered mobile number, SIM binding and UPI PIN, and that the complainant was responsible for maintaining the confidentiality of her credentials. They also argued that she had reported the transaction late and had not raised a chargeback within 45 days. The Cyber Crime Police, arrayed as the third opposite party, did not appear despite service of notice and were set ex parte.

The complaint was filed beyond the two-year limitation period under Section 69(1) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019. However, considering the complainant’s prompt reporting, SBI’s internal correspondence showing that it had processed her complaint, and her subsequent efforts before the police, the Commission found sufficient cause to condone the delay. It clarified that the earlier admission of the complaint did not, by itself, amount to condonation.

On merits, the Commission found that the complainant’s version and the police record relating to the FIR supported her case that the transaction resulted from third-party cyber fraud, and that there was no sufficient evidence that she had authorised the payment or shared her credentials. SBI had also not shown that the transaction was caused by any act or omission on its part, so the Commission treated it as a third-party breach for which neither party was shown to be responsible. UPI PIN authentication, without evidence of her authorisation or negligence, was insufficient to fasten liability on her.

Paragraph 6(ii) of the RBI circular provides zero liability for third-party breaches where neither the bank nor the customer is responsible, if the customer reports within three working days of the bank’s communication. Paragraph 12 of the RBI circular places the burden of proving customer liability on the bank. Paragraph 8 of the circular excludes the date of receipt of the bank’s communication when counting working days. Accepting the complainant’s counsel’s calculation, the Commission excluded November 3, 2022, the date of the bank’s communication, counted November 4 and 5 (the first Saturday) as the first two working days, excluded Sunday, November 6, as a bank holiday, and treated November 7 as the third. As SBI acknowledged her representation that day, she had reported in time and was entitled to zero liability.

SBI’s correspondence showed that it referred the complaint to its UPI Support Team, requested the beneficiary bank to place a hold on the beneficiary account and sought blocking of the remitter’s UPI VPA through the remitter application team. However, the Commission found no evidence of effective follow-up, recovery of the amount or proper resolution being communicated to the complainant. It held that the bank’s failure to resolve the complaint and restore the amount constituted deficiency in banking service. The objection regarding non-raising of a chargeback within 45 days did not, by itself, absolve the bank of its obligations under the applicable RBI directions.

The Commission directed SBI’s Anneparthi Branch and Regional Office, jointly and severally, to refund ₹55,000 with interest at 6% per annum from November 3, 2022, until realisation, along with ₹20,000 as compensation and ₹10,000 towards costs. The amounts are to be paid within 45 days of receipt of a copy of the order. The complaint against the Cyber Crime Police was dismissed without costs, as the complainant had approached them in the exercise of their statutory functions and had not availed of any service for consideration under Section 2(7) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019. The order is appealable.

The Supreme Court, in State Bank of India v. Pallabh Bhowmick & Ors. (SLP (C) No. 30677 of 2024), decided on January 3, 2025, had upheld a Gauhati High Court judgment directing SBI to refund ₹94,204.80 to a customer who promptly reported unauthorised online transactions and against whom no negligence was established. Relying on the RBI circular dated July 6, 2017, the Court observed that banks should remain vigilant, as they have the best technology available to detect and prevent unauthorised and fraudulent transactions.

For commercial banks, the 2017 circular’s instructions have since been consolidated in the Reserve Bank of India (Commercial Banks – Responsible Business Conduct) Directions, 2025. They were revised by the Third Amendment Directions, 2026, issued on June 24, 2026, which apply to electronic banking transactions on or after January 1, 2027. The 2017 framework applied to this case because the transaction took place on November 3, 2022.

Under the 2026 Directions, the burden of proving customer liability continues to lie on the bank. A customer is entitled to zero liability and reversal of the transaction in a third-party breach if the fraudulent transaction is reported to the bank within five calendar days of its occurrence, in place of the earlier three working days from receipt of the bank’s communication. The Directions also define negligence by a bank, negligence by a customer and third-party breach. Customer negligence includes failing to exercise reasonable care in the use of credentials such as a PIN, password or OTP. Banks must examine a complaint, establish liability and respond to the customer within 45 calendar days for domestic fraudulent transactions. Where zero liability applies, the reversal must be value-dated to the date of the original transaction.