The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that an interest exclusion clause ending with the words “or otherwise” can stop an arbitral tribunal from awarding pre-reference and pendente lite interest under Section 31(7)(a) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. In M/s Sharma Enterprises v. National Building Construction Corporation (NBCC) [2026 INSC 1135; Civil Appeal No. 13782 of 2026, decided on October 15, 2026], the contractor lost interest for the period up to the award but kept its substantive claims and post-award interest.
On January 11, 1991, NBCC awarded the appellant a subcontract worth about ₹9.51 crore for flooring and cladding work at the Vashi Railway Station-cum-Commercial Complex in Navi Mumbai. The work depended on civil works by another contractor engaged by the respondent, and those were not completed. On September 22, 1992, the respondent terminated the subcontract and encashed the appellant’s bank guarantees.
Following prolonged litigation, the Supreme Court appointed an arbitrator in 2011. In an award dated July 28, 2016, the arbitrator held that the respondent had wrongfully terminated the contract and allowed several monetary claims in favour of the appellant, with interest at 10% per annum on the awarded sums (except costs) from September 22, 1992, until payment. After the Supreme Court held in 2021 that the proceedings were governed by the 1996 Act and not the Arbitration Act, 1940, the respondent challenged the award under Section 34. A Single Judge of the Delhi High Court upheld the substantive claims but set aside the pre-reference and pendente lite interest, holding that Clause 26 of the Special Conditions of Contract barred it. The Single Judge relied on Sayeed Ahmed and Company v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(2009) 12 SCC 26], and the Division Bench, in appeal under Section 37, treated “or otherwise” in Clause 26 as equivalent to the phrase “or any other respect whatsoever” considered in that case.
Clause 26 said no claim for interest would be entertained by the respondent on balance payments or deposits held up because of a dispute, or on delay in monthly or final payments, “or otherwise”. Before the Supreme Court, the appellant argued that the phrase must take colour from the preceding items under ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis and so covered only delayed running bills. It also noted that the respondent had not relied on Clause 26 before the arbitrator.
The Court began with the statute. Section 31(7)(a) allows pre-award interest “unless otherwise agreed by the parties”, and must be read with Section 28(3), which, the Court said, requires a tribunal to decide in accordance with the contractual terms. Relying on Union of India v. Larsen & Toubro Limited [2026 INSC 203], it held that a tribunal cannot award pre-award interest against a binding contractual prohibition, even as compensation.
On interpretation, the Court said ejusdem generis applies only where the preceding words form a distinct class. Clause 26 listed three events joined disjunctively by “or”: balance payments or deposits held up due to a dispute, delay in monthly or final payments, and “otherwise”. The events preceding “or otherwise” did not form a narrow class confined to delayed running payments and, following Union of India v. Manraj Enterprises [(2022) 2 SCC 331], each had to be read independently. “Or otherwise” was residuary and covered every other situation in which interest might be claimed. Citing the Constitution Bench decision in Lilavati Bai v. State of Bombay [(1957) 1 SCC 411], the Court treated these words as words of extension, not limitation; confining them to delayed payments would make them redundant and rewrite the contract.
The Court distinguished ONGC v. G&T Beckfield Drilling Services [2025 SCC OnLine SC 1888], where the clause covered only delayed payments or disputed claims and had no residuary words, noting that ONGC itself recognised that a clause barring interest expressly or by necessary implication excludes the tribunal’s power. It held Clause 26 stood on the same footing as the clauses in Sayeed Ahmed (“or any other respect whatsoever”) and Jaiprakash Associates v. Tehri Hydro Development Corporation [(2019) 17 SCC 786]. The arbitrator, as a creature of the contract, had exceeded his jurisdiction.
Post-award interest was different. Relying on Larsen & Toubro, the Court noted that Section 31(7)(b) is not subject to party autonomy, so parties cannot contract out of post-award interest. The Court agreed with the High Court that only interest up to the award should be set aside and dismissed the appeal.


